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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P1a int i f f-Re spondent, 
vs. 
PETER FOUKAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 14135 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action arising out of appellant's alleged 
traffic violation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was, upon stipulated facts, taken under 
advisement by the Court. From a judgment of guilty, the 
defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was observed by an officer of the Utah 
State Highway Patrol on April 27, 1974, driving on a highway 
with a posted speed limit of 55 M.P.H. in Davis County. 
The officer clocked appellant's speed to exceed the posted 
speed limit, stopped the appellant's vehicle, and issued a 
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traffic citation for driving at 60 M.P.H. 
In January, 1974, pursuant to the Emergency Highway 
Energy Conservation Act, the Governor of the State of Utah 
declared by proclamation; and the Utah State Road Commission 
adopted by resolution a maximum speed limit on highways 
throughout the State of Utah of 55 M.P.H. Prior to January, 
1974, the posted speed limit on the highway in question was 
65 M.P.H. 
ISSUES 
1. Was the reduced maximum speed limit on the highway 
in question properly established? 
2. Was a valid maximum speed limit of 55 M.P.H. 
created? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE GOVERNORfS PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING A 
MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS WITHIN UTAH 
OF 55 M.P.H. WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953) § 41-6-46(4) AND THUS IS 
VOID. 
The Governor of the State of Utah is granted the 
authority to reduce tha maximum speed limit by the terms 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-46(4): 
"(4) Provided, that the governor by proclamation, 
in time of war or national emergency, may upon 
recommendation of the federal authorities, change 
the speed on the highways of the state, to conform 
to such recommendations. 
However, the language of the statute clearly indicates 
that a two-pronged test must be met in order for the Governor 
to act by changing the speed limit. First, federal authorities 
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must recommend a change in the speed limit. Second, there 
must be a national emergency (we are not here concerned 
with the statutory clause referring to time of war). 
The Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, H. R. 
11372, Public Law 93-239,87 Statute 1046 (January 2, 1974, 
93rd Congress, 1st Session) was passed for the purpose of 
conserving fuel during periods of current and imminent 
shortages of fuel through the establishment of a national 
maximum highway speed limit. The language of this Act 
appears to satisfy the first prong of the test, in that 
federal authorities were recommending a change in the speed 
limit. However, it may be significant to note that states 
not following the "recommendation" by adopting the proposed 
speed limit would suffer a loss of federal revenues in those 
programs involving state highway systems. In this sense, the 
Act has more of the character of an extortionate command 
than a recommendation. 
In the Governor's Proclamation declaring a reduction 
in the maximum speed limit, it recites the declared existence 
of conditions which constitute a national emergency in 
regard to motor vehicle fuel. However, it does not appear 
just where and when such a national emergency was declared, 
if in fact it ever was, nor has Respondent substantiated 
in his pleadings the otherwise conclusory allegation of the 
Governor. Neither does the language of the Emergency Highway 
Energy Conservation act refer to the existence of any 
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national emergency other than the usage of the word "Emergency" 
in the title of the Act. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-46(4) offers little 
guidance in determining what constitutes a time of national 
emergency sufficient to warrant a reduction of the maximum 
speed limit by the Governor. The statute does not recite 
that a national emergency must be formally declared. However, 
it is relevant to note that in the related area of emergency 
situations, i.e., flood, earthquake, etc., a state of 
emergency must be declared for the stricken area to quality 
for emergency assistance funding. On the other hand, the 
spirit of the statute surely would not permit the Governor 
to take action based on a declaration of national emergency 
when in fact there was no national emergency. According 
to Respondent, the Utah Legislature left it up to the Governor 
to decide what (presumably) constitutes a national emergency 
(Plaintiff's Reply Brief, page 2 refers to an emergency in 
Utah), and that he declared such an emergency. This standard 
is manifestatively unreasonable, as it differs little from 
the situation noted above in which a non-existent national 
emergency is declared. It is unrealistic to assume that 
the state legislature granted the unfettered discretion to 
the Governor to determine just what it is that constitutes 
a national emergency. Appellant submits that the most 
appropriate and reasonable criteria for determining what 
constitutes a time of national emergency is whether such 
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an emergency actually exists, not whether one has been 
declared. Appellant further submits that the so-called 
"energy crisis" presented at the time of the Governor's 
Proclamation and Appellant's speeding citation was insuf-
ficient basis to constitute the existence of a national 
emergency. Thus the second prong of the test was not met 
for purposes of invoking the authority of Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 41-6-46(4). Therefore, the maximum speed limit reduction 
on Utah's highways to 55 M.P.H. cannot be validly based on 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-4 6(4) or the Governor's Proclamation 
under said statute. 
POINT II: THE RESOLUTION BY THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
ADOPTING A MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS 
WITHIN UTAH OF 55 M.P.H. WAS NOT AUTHORIZED 
BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) §§ 27-12-121 AND 
41-6-47 AND THUS IS VOID. 
The Utah State Road Commission's Resolution relies on 
three factors used to justify adoption of a reduced maximum 
speed limit. The first two, namely the Emergency Highway 
Energy Conservation Act and the Governor's Proclamation, 
are not valid justifications for reasons discussed in Point 
I. Thus the sole basis set forth in the resolution for 
the adoption is the statutory provision Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121 which authorizes the State Road Commission 
...to do all other things necessary fully 
to carry out the cooperation contemplated 
and provided for by... 
the provisions of Title 23, United States Code Annotated, 
relating to federal aid for highway purposes, together with 
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all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. This 
statute, it is argued by Respondent, grants blanket authority 
to the State Road Commission to change the maximum speed 
limit necessary in order for the state to remain qualified 
for the receipt of federal monies for highway purposes. 
While the general provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121 seem to authorize a reduction of the maximum 
speed limit, the Utah State Legislature has specifically 
designated the standard by which the State Road Commission 
must meet in order to change the prima facie speed limit. 
The provision, Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-47, provides 
as follows: 
PRIMA FACIE LIMIT - Whenever the State Road 
Commission shall determine on the basis of an 
engineering and traffic investigation that 
any prima facie speed hereinbefore set forth 
is greater or less than is reasonable or safe 
under the conditions found to exist...upon 
any part of a state highway, said commission 
may determine and declare a reasonable and safe 
prima facie speed limit thereat which shall be 
effective when appropriate signs giving notice 
thereof are erected at such...part of the 
highway (emphasis added). 
It is clearly apparent that the State Road Commission, 
in its resolution reducing the maximum speed limit, did not 
meet this standard for making such a change as is indicated 
in the language of Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-47. 
Appellant submits that Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-4 7 
is specific and maintains controlling precedence over 
Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121, in limiting what the State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Road Commission can do about highway speed, the latter 
statute having more of a general character. Thus it is 
contended that the State Road Commission misplaced its 
reliance on Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 as a proper 
basis for the resolution adopting a maximum speed limit 
of 55 M.P.H. Therefore, the State Road Commission has 
wrongly exceeded the statutory guidelines and scope of 
authority granted to it pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 41-6-47. 
POINT III. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
§ 27-12-121 AS APPLIED BY THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION IN ITS RESOLUTION ADOPTING A 
MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS WITHIN UTAH 
OF 55 M.P.H. ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
AND INDEFINITE, RENDERING SAID RESOLUTION 
VOID, 
Point III is asserted in the alternative, should this 
Court determine that the Resolution of the State Road Com-
mission in question was authorized by Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121. Referring to the language of said statute as 
set forth in Point II, and the interpretation of the language 
as contended by Respondent, it apparently grants to the 
State Road Commission the power to do virtually anything. 
Upon a careful examination and reading of Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121, in its entirety (the validity of the remainder 
of the statute being not in issue here), it can be reasonably 
interpreted that the Utah State Legislature may have reserved 
the authority in itself to take action similar to the 
Resolution of the State Highway Commission, However, it 
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cannot be reasonably asserted that such authority was granted 
to the State Highway Commission beyond the unclear dimensions 
of "to do all other things necessary fully." The last two 
words quoted suggest that some unintended error may have 
occurred in the formulation of the statute. Regardless, 
whatever standard is intended by the language of Utah Code 
Annotated, § 27-12-121 is vague and indefinite. Appellant 
asserts that the quality of such standard set by the statutory 
language renders it unconstitutional for purposes which 
Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 has been applied in the 
instant case. Such unconstitutionality, in turn, voids 
the Resolution of the State Road Commission adopting a 
maximum speed limit of 55 M.P.H. 
In its response to this contention, Respondent asserts 
the statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and has 
cited case law rejecting a contention that the wording of 
a statute in question constituted an unconstitutional 
delegation of the legislative function. This latter argument 
is not in issue in the instant case, and though it is 
conceded that statutes are presumed constitutional, this 
is really beside the point, since the presumption is 
rebuttable. Appellant's argument is that Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121 is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, and 
not that it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of 
authority. Further, it is argued that, under the facts 
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and circumstances of this case, the presumption of statutory 
constitutionality should be considered overcome. In this 
regard, Point III should be read in conjunction with Point 
II, since it is also argued that Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 27-12-121 does not authorize the Resolution adopted by 
the State Road Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Briefly to reiterate, the position of Appellant is 
that the means of reducing the maximum speed limit on high-
ways in Utah, namely the Governor's Proclamation and the 
State Road Commission's Resolution, were not authorized by 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §§§ 41-6-46(4), 41-6-47, and 
27-12-121. In the alternative, it is asserted that Utah 
Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 is unconstitutional as applied 
to this case. Either way, the reduction of the maximum 
speed limit in Utah was improper. Therefore, Appellant 
could not be validly cited for driving at 60 M.P.H. on a 
highway which had a maximum speed limit of 65 M.P.H., the 
limit in force at the time of the Governor's Proclamation 
and the State Road Commission's Resolution. Thus, the 
judgment of guilty must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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